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v. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
In addition to the statutory provisions set forth in the 
opening brief of appellant Park City Education Association 
("PCEA"), we rely on Utah Code Ann. ("UCA") § 53A-8-103(1), which 
reads as follows: 
A local school board shall, by contract with its 
educators or their associations or by resolution of the 
board, establish procedures for dismissal of educators 
in an orderly manner without discrimination. 
ARGUMENT 
The question in this case is whether appellee Board of 
Education of the Park City School District ("Board") was 
obligated, pursuant to the 1988-1990 Master Contract between the 
Board and PCEA, to provide health insurance coverage during the 
1989-90 school year for all members of the bargaining unit, 
including part-time teachers Nancy Schulthess and Margery Hadden. 
In our opening brief ("PCEA Br."), we demonstrated that the 
answer to this question is yes. Specifically, we explained why 
the trial court erred when it held that paragraph 2.3 of the 
Master Contract — which provides that the terms of that Contract 
(including Article V, which obligates the Board to pay the cost 
of health insurance coverage for part-time teachers, Record on 
Appeal ("R.") 208), are to supersede any conflicting Board 
policies (including Policy GCDA, which provides that part-time 
teachers "will not be eligible for health . . . insurance 
coverage," R. 109) — is invalid as "an unlawful limitation on 
2. 
the Board's legislative authority." R. 274. In its responding 
brief ("Board Br."), the Board makes three specific 
counterarguments. As we now show, however, none of these 
counterarguments has any merit. 
A. The Board's Argument That "The Board May 
Not Be Precluded from Adopting or Amending 
Its Policies" (Board Br. 12-26) 
We argued in our opening brief that the trial court's 
holding that the Board could not lawfully agree that the terms of 
the Master Contract would prevail over unilaterally adopted Board 
policies "in effect denies school boards the authority to enter 
into any binding contract." PCEA Br. 13 (emphasis in original). 
The Board makes no attempt to rebut this argument, but instead 
validates it by contending that any restriction on "the ability 
of the Board to at all times adopt, amend or rescind its 
policies," Board Br. 16, would be "an unlawful limitation on the 
Board's legislative authority." Id. at 12. It follows from this 
contention that the Board can at any time unilaterally alter the 
terms of any contract that it has entered into, and this 
necessarily would be true whether the Board's contracting partner 
was a vendor supplying goods, an individual employee agreeing to 
provide services, or a union negotiating a collective bargaining 
agreement. We demonstrated in our opening brief why this result 
3. 
is directly contrary both to the statutes of this State (which 
expressly grant contracting authority to school boards), PCEA Br. 
13-14, and to the basic concept of a contract, id. at 13.1 We 
will not at this juncture reiterate the arguments made in our 
opening brief, and by way of supplementation simply would note 
the patent incompatibility between the Board's argument that its 
ability to adopt, amend or rescind its employment policies cannot 
be "restricted by agreement with private entities," Board Br. 14, 
and its subsequent argument that "Utah Law Allows Individuals to 
Contract Directly with Their Employer," jLd. at 26, and that Ms. 
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden "cannot now claim that those 
[individual employment] contracts are unenforceable." Id. at 
27.2 
1By definition, a contract creates obligations for both 
contracting parties. As the United States Supreme Court has 
explained: "A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or 
change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity." United 
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 n.23 (1977) 
(quoting Murray v. Charleston. 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878)). See 
also Perry v. United States. 294 U.S. 330, 351 n.3 (1935) ("[i]t 
is in theory impossible to reconcile the idea of a promise which 
obliges, with a power to make a law which can vary the effect of 
it") . 
2In challenging the validity of section 2.3 of the Master 
Contract the Board states that because "this contractual 
provision would prevent the Board from amending its policies 
regarding benefits, compensation, personnel, termination and many 
other essential matters," it "would be an unlawful limitation on 
the Board's legislative authority." Board Br. 12 (emphasis 
added). The Board's contention that it has a nonbargainable 
right unilaterally to alter policies regarding "termination" is 
belied by its citation, see id. at 20 n.2, of UCA § 53A-8-103(1), 
which provides in relevant part: 
4. 
While repeatedly reciting that the Board "cannot be 
precluded from amending its policies, adopting additional 
policies, or rescinding existing policies," e.g., id. at 12, the 
Board fails to focus on the specific circumstances in which the 
Utah courts have found an unlawful delegation. As we and the 
Board apparently agree, the leading case is Salt Lake City v. 
International Ass'n of Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977). 
In that case, the legislature had provided that when 
municipalities and firefighter associations were unable to agree 
in negotiations on the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement, all unresolved issues would be submitted to a panel of 
arbitrators which would decide what the terms of the agreement 
would be. Thus, it was the arbitrators who would actually make 
the final decisions about government policy with respect to those 
issues. The question raised by these facts was whether the 
legislature could "delegate unlimited discretion to an ad hoc 
panel of private persons to make basic governmental policy." Id. 
at 789. The Utah Supreme Court answered that question in the 
negative. 
A local school board shall, by contract with its 
educators or their associations or by resolution of the 
board, establish procedures for dismissal [i.e., 
termination] of educators . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
5. 
The Board draws from Salt Lake City the conclusion that 
section 2.3 of the Master Contract is unlawful — not because it 
delegates decisionmaking responsibility to an arbitration panel 
or some other private entity — but because it constitutes "an 
absolute surrender of the Board's legislatively delegated 
authority to govern its affairs through the enactment, amendment 
and recision of its policies." Board Br. 14. But section 2.3 — 
which comes into play only after the parties have voluntarily 
reached a complete agreement on the terms and conditions of 
employment and which simply obligates the Board to comply with 
that agreement — can be characterized as "an [unlawful] absolute 
surrender" of the Board's authority only if we accept the 
previously discredited proposition that school boards lack the 
authority to enter into any binding contract. 
Nothing in the Salt Lake City decision supports such a 
characterization, and the Utah Supreme Court has explicitly 
recognized the critical distinction between a provision that 
permits an arbitrator to substitute his or her judgment for that 
of a governmental entity in establishing the terms and conditions 
of public employment in the first instance (as in Salt Lake City) 
and a provision that obligates a governmental entity to comply 
with an already existing, voluntarily negotiated contract. In 
Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 
1981), the court rejected a municipality's attempt to invalidate 
the arbitration clause contained in a construction contract it 
had agreed to. Holding that the municipality's authority to 
6. 
contract gave it the power to submit to arbitration any 
contractual claim asserted by or against it, the court noted that 
the arbitration clause 
applied only to disputes about compliance with terms 
fixed by the contract. Such a clause was not an 
abdication of the municipalityfs duties towards new 
matters which might arise in the future, but only 
constituted a present agreement that disputes which 
might arise under the contract would be arbitrated. 
Id. at 1075. In contrast to the Salt Lake City case, the court 
concluded that these facts "did not involve a delegation of 
unlimited discretion to an ad hoc panel of private persons to 
make basic governmental policy." Id. at 1075 & n.21. 
If a governmental entity does not unlawfully delegate its 
legislative authority by agreeing to arbitrate disputes that 
arise out of a contract it has agreed to, then, a fortiori, the 
agreement to be bound by the terms of the underlying contract 
itself cannot constitute an unlawful delegation (or, in the 
Board's words, "an absolute surrender") of the governmental 
entity's authority. Under the Board's view that "no agreement 
can lawfully supersede the Board's authority and duty to act," 
Board Br. 13, not only the arbitration clause in Lindon City, but 
also the underlying contract itself, would have been an unlawful 
delegation. What the Board overlooks is that one way in which a 
governmental entity "acts" is by contract, and Lindon City makes 
clear that in binding itself contractually a governmental entity 
does not unlawfully delegate its authority. 
7. 
The Board's apparent failure to grasp the critical 
distinction between making a contract and being bound by a 
contract once it is made is further evidenced by its attempt to 
distinguish two cases relied upon by PCEA in its opening brief — 
Littleton Education Ass'n v. Arapahoe County School District, 553 
P.2d 793 (Colo. 1976), and Louisiana Teachers Ass'n v. Orleans 
Parish School Bd.f 303 So. 2d 564 (La. Ct. App. 1974). See Board 
Br. 21-24. 
With respect to the negotiation of future contracts, the 
collective bargaining agreement in Littleton established a 
procedure under which the school board retained the ultimate 
decisionmaking authority with regard to any issues upon which the 
parties were unable to agree. See 553 P.2d at 796. It was in 
that respect that the Littleton agreement differed from the city 
ordinance at issue in Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 553 
P.2d 790 (Colo. 1976). The latter ordinance, which was struck 
down by the Colorado Supreme Court as an unlawful delegation of 
legislative authority on the same day that the court sustained 
the agreement in Littleton, provided that in case of an impasse 
in negotiations the unresolved issues would be submitted to 
binding arbitration. 
The Master Contract in this case contains no provisions for 
the resolution of impasses in the negotiation of future 
contracts; the terms of any such contracts are to be determined 
by the parties through voluntary negotiations. It is, therefore, 
entirely within the Board's discretion whether or not it will 
8. 
agree to any particular term. As in Littleton, fl [n]egotations 
between an employer and an employee organization entered into 
voluntarily, as in this case, do not require the employer to 
agree with the proposals submitted by employees." 553 P.2d at 
796. Here, no less than in Littleton, the Board "retain[s] its 
legislatively delegated authority to make the final decision in 
matters so important to its operation," Board Br. 22-23, by 
deciding whether or not to bind itself contractually to any 
particular term. Once a contract has been concluded, on the 
other hand, it is binding on the parties that signed it — in 
Littleton just as in this case.3 
The Board's attempt to distinguish Louisiana Teachers' 
Ass'n, see Board Br. 24, likewise is misguided. The court held 
in that case that requiring a school board to comply with a 
collective bargaining agreement was not an unlawful delegation of 
the school board's authority because the school board "retains 
the right of final decision as to what terms and conditions it 
will agree to. Indeed, it retains the right to decide not to 
agree at all." 303 So. 2d at 568. That is precisely the 
situation that obtains here. 
3As the Board observes at another point in its brief, under UCA 
§§ 53A-3-411(l) and 53A-8-103(l) a school board retains the 
authority to decide to contract only individually with its 
educators (or other employees), rather than engaging in 
collective bargaining. Board Br. 2 0 n.2. That is a correct, but 
irrelevant observation. Once a school board has chosen to 
conclude a collective bargaining agreement, it cannot avoid the 
contract it has made on the ground that it could have chosen a 
different option. 
9. 
Nor do any of the out-of-state cases on which the Board 
relies, see Board Br. 16-2 0, advance its cause. First, the Board 
cites several California cases for the proposition that "[a] 
school board cannot bar itself or future boards from adopting 
subsequent resolutions which may alter earlier established 
policies." Id. at 16. But to the extent that statement is meant 
to suggest that a school board may not enter into a contract that 
limits its future freedom of action, it goes well beyond the 
teaching of the cited cases.4 
People's Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 
640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), and City & County of San Francisco v. 
Patterson, 248 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988), both 
invalidated statutory initiatives that sought to limit the 
ability of legislative bodies to enact certain legislation. 
Holding that such a limitation could be imposed only by 
constitutional or charter amendment, the court observed that a 
legislative body may not, "by normal legislative enactment, . . . 
divest itself or future boards of the power to enact legislation 
4The Board also cites Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 86-40 (Aug. 11, 
1986), for the proposition that "a board is free to modify or 
repeal policies adopted by prior boards." Board Br. 16. The 
cited opinion does state that a board may "amend or rescind [a] 
rule or policy adopted by the prior board," Op. No. 86-40 
(emphasis added), but it does not suggest that a board may simply 
disregard a contract entered into by a prior board. And the 
Attorney General has made clear in another opinion that a school 
board may not do so: "If the Board has previously exercised 
[its] discretion in a duly negotiated agreement . . . , then the 
Board should abide [by] the terms of the agreement for its 
duration." Utah Attfy Gen. Op. No. 85-73 (Mar. 11, 1986). 
10. 
within its competence." 226 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47; 248 Cal. Rptr. 
at 296. The Board's attempt to extend that principle to bar a 
governmental agency from binding itself by contract proves far 
too much, for it would preclude a school board (or other 
governmental entity) from entering into any contract. That is 
not the law in California or in Utah. 
Nor does City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 534 P.2d 
403 (Cal. 1975), which does present a factual situation somewhat 
closer to the case at bar, support the Board's position,, The 
court's holding in Cooper was that the school board's adoption of 
a resolution governing the terms of employment, which precluded 
changes in those terms without the assent of the "employee 
council," was in violation of the specific statutory scheme that 
then governed public school employment in California. See 534 
P.2d at 423. Under that statute, the Winton Act, collective 
bargaining between school boards and employee representatives was 
not permitted.5 The objectionable language was thus not part of 
5The Winton Act provided that representatives of school boards 
and a "council" of their employees should "meet and confer" over, 
inter alia, the terms and conditions of employment, with the 
objective of reaching agreement on recommendations that would be 
submitted to the school board. See 534 P.2d at 421-22. The 
school board and the employee council were not permitted under 
the Winton Act to conclude a binding written contract; only a 
resolution of the board adopting the "meet and confer" 
recommendations was of legal force. Id. at 421-23 (citing Grasko 
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 107 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1973)). In short, collective bargaining between school 
boards and employee representatives was not allowed. In 1975, 
the Winton Act was replaced by the Educational Employment 
Relations (Rodda) Act, under which school boards are required to 
11. 
a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract. Rather, 
it was contained in a resolution adopted by the school board. 
The court's holding that "a school board cannot, by resolution, 
bar itself or future boards from adopting subsequent resolutions 
which may alter earlier established policies," id. (emphasis 
added), says nothing about the ability of a school board to bind 
itself to the terms of a contract, where — as is the case in 
Utah — collective bargaining JLS permitted.6 And, as we have 
already shown, collective bargaining would be illusory if a 
school board could not enter into a legally binding and 
enforceable contract. 
Finally, the Board cites several cases from other 
jurisdictions in which specific substantive provisions of 
collective bargaining agreements were held to constitute 
impermissible delegations of a school board's legislative 
authority. In Mindemann v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 111 
P.2d 996 (Okla. 1989), the court held that a school board could 
bargain collectively with the majority representatives of their 
employees. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3540 et seq. 
6Indeed, the Cooper court made clear that, even though a school 
board could not engage in collective bargaining under the Winton 
Act, it could conclude other contracts (such as individual 
contracts of employment with its teachers), and the terms of 
those contracts would limit the board's freedom to act by 
resolution. See 534 P.2d at 424 n.18. Thus, it is clear that, 
in holding that a board could not "by resolution" limit its 
freedom to change its policies in the future, the court did not 
intend to foreclose the board from entering into contracts — to 
the extent that it was legally authorized to do so — that would 
have the effect of placing limits on its ability to change its 
policies at will. 
12. 
not be required to submit to arbitration, pursuant to a grievance 
procedure in a collective bargaining agreement, its decision not 
to reemploy a probationary teacher and to discontinue coaching 
assignments of tenured teachers. In Raines v. Independent School 
Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303 (Okla. 1990), the court relied upon 
Mindemann in holding that a school board's decision to reprimand 
a teacher could not be submitted to arbitration under a 
collective bargaining agreement. In neither case, however, did 
the Oklahoma court hold that the arbitration of contractual 
grievances is per se unlawful, or that a school board cannot as a 
general matter be required to comply with obligations agreed to 
in a collective bargaining agreement. In both cases, the 
decision was bottomed on the fact that the specific substantive 
issues that the union sought to submit to arbitration involved 
decisions which by statute were expressly reserved to unilateral 
school board action. As the court put it in Mindemann, "a local 
board of education may [not] voluntarily enter into a collective 
bargaining agreement providing for binding arbitration" of school 
board decisions regarding substantive matters "which are 
statutorily vested in the exclusive authority and discretion of 
the school board." 771 P.2d at 9 99.7 
7Even if Mindemann or Raines could be read more broadly -— for 
the proposition that a school board may, and indeed must,, 
repudiate a contractual agreement with a union to submit disputes 
about the meaning or application of the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement to arbitration — they would be contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of judicial authority. Thus, at least 
the following jurisdictions allow a public employer to 
13. 
In Miller v. Board of Education, Unified School Dist. No. 
470, 744 P.2d 865 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987), afffd on other grounds, 
752 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1988), the court invalidated a collective 
bargaining agreement provision governing teacher dismissal that 
voluntarily agree to submit to binding grievance arbitration 
contractual disputes that do not involve a decision that is by 
statute expressly reserved to the employer: Lake Wash. School 
Dist. No. 414 v. Lake Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 745 P.2d 504 (Wash. 
1987), modified, 757 P.2d 533 (Wash. 1988); Local Division No. 
812 v. Central W. Va. Transit Auth., 365 S.E.2d 76 (W.Va. 1987); 
Paranko v. State, 509 A.2d 508 (Conn. 1986); Board of Educ. v. 
Bremen Dist. No. 228 Joint Faculty Ass'n, 461 N.E.2d 406 (111. 
1984) ; Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 
343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1983); City & County of Denver v. Denver 
Firefighters Local No. 858, 663 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1983); Cape 
Elizabeth School Bd. v. Cape Elizabeth Teachers Ass'n, 459 A.2d 
166 (Me. 1983); Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids Lodge No. 97 
Fraternal Order of Police, 330 N.W.2d 52 (Mich. 1982); Civil 
Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 397 N.E.2d 350 
(N.Y. 1979); Woodstock Union High School Bd. v. Woodstock Union 
High School Teachers' Org., 388 A.2d 392 (Vt. 1978); State v. 
Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904 (Minn. 1977); West Fargo Pub. School 
Dist. No. 6 v. West Fargo Educ. Ass'n, 259 N.W.2d 612 (N.D. 
1977); Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, 346 A.2d 
35 (Pa. 1975) ; Dayton Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Dayton Bd., 323 
N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 1975); Richards v. Board of Educ, 206 N.W.2d 
597 (Wis. 1973); Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v. 
Evansville Teachers Ass'n, 494 N.E.2d 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); 
Worcester v. Borghesi, 477 N.E.2d 155 (Mass. Ct. App. 1985); 
Howard County Bd. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n, Inc., 487 A.2d 
1220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); City of Pompano Beach v. Meiroff, 
410 So. 2d 663 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982). In City & County of Denver, 
the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the difference between 
grievance arbitration (at issue in these cases) and interest 
arbitration (at issue in the Salt Lake City and Greeley Police 
Union cases): 
Binding interest arbitration allows the arbitrator to 
substitute his judgment for that of public officials on 
matters the electorate has entrusted to its elected 
representatives. . . . Grievance arbitration, on the 
other hand, arises only after the parties have reached 
complete agreement on terms and conditions of 
employment. 
663 P.2d at 1037-38. 
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deviated from statutory provisions on that subject. The court's 
reasoning was that a contractual provision violating "specific 
statutory terms" was void. Id. at 868. Its holding, cited by 
the Board, that a "municipal corporation cannot in any manner 
bind itself by any contract which is beyond the scope of its 
powers," id. at 869, is simply of no relevance here, as the 
ability to contract with its employees concerning the provision 
of health insurance is clearly within a school board's powers.8 
B. The Board's Argument That "Utah Law Allows 
Individuals to Contract Directly With Their 
Employer Regardless of Existing Collective 
Bargaining Agreements" (Board Br. 26-28) 
After contending in Part A of its brief that any contract 
that restricts "the ability of the Board to at all times adopt, 
amend or rescind its [employment] policies," Board Br. 16, would 
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, the 
Board now argues that Utah law allows the Board to enter into 
individual employment contracts with its employees, and that Ms. 
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden "cannot now claim that [their 
8It is not our position, as the Board suggests, Board Br. 21, 25, 
that any contract, whatever its terms, is within the Board's 
power or immune from challenge as an unlawful delegation. 
(Indeed, the severance clause contained in paragraph 2.1 of the 
Master Contract recognizes that certain contractual provisions 
could be invalid.) Our point is simply that agreeing to be bound 
by the terms of a contract is not per se an unlawful delegation 
of authority. There has been no suggestion in this case that 
either the subject matter of the Master Contract — the terms and 
conditions of teachers' employment, including specifically 
provisions for health insurance coverage — or its two-year 
duration was beyond the contracting authority granted to the 
Board by UCA § 53A-3-411(1). 
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individual employment] contracts are unenforceable.11 Id. at 27. 
As we now show, this patent inconsistency with its prior argument 
is by no means the only defect in the Board's present argument. 
The Board begins this section of its brief by misstating the 
position of PCEA. Contrary to the Boardfs assertion, PCEA does 
not contend "that the Board is prohibited from negotiating 
directly with the Association's individual members," id. at 26, 
and indeed, the Master Contract itself expressly contemplates 
that it will be supplemented by an individual employment contract 
for each teacher. R. 201 (f 2.2).9 What the Board apparently 
means, in contending that "Utah Law Allows Individuals to 
Contract Directly with Their Employer Regardless of Existing 
Collective Bargaining Agreements," Board Br. 26 (emphasis added), 
is that after contractually binding itself to provide certain 
benefits to all members of the bargaining unit, it may still 
enter into individual contracts that deny those benefits or that 
otherwise conflict with its contractual obligations under the 
Master Contract.10 Thus, the question here is not simply, as the 
9Nor is that unusual: even where an employer is required by law 
to bargain collectively with the majority representative of its 
employees — as, for example, under the National Labor Relations 
Act ("NLRA") — a collective bargaining agreement may "leave 
certain areas open to individual bargaining." J.I. Case Co. v. 
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944). 
10Without citation to anything in the record, the Board asserts 
in its brief that Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signed their 
individual contracts "[w]hile the [Master] contract was under 
renegotiation" in the fall of 1989. Board Br. 27. What the 
record in fact shows is that the Master Contract was a two-year 
agreement, executed on September 21, 1988, R. 200, to cover the 
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Board puts it, whether employees covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement can "contract directly with their employer." 
Board Br. 26. Clearly they can, at least to the extent those 
individual contracts are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement. The question rather is 
whether the Board may, as a condition of employment, require 
employees already covered by a collective bargaining agreement to 
accept separate, individual contracts on terms inferior to those 
of the collective bargaining agreement.11 To state the question 
school years 1988-89 and 1989-90. R. 197, 201 (5 2.2). Pursuant 
to a limited reopener, the Board and PCEA conducted negotiations 
during the fall of 1989 over certain specific provisions of the 
contract, including notably the $197 per month ceiling on health 
insurance coverage contained in paragraph 5.1.2 of the Master 
Contract. See R. 239. After the conclusion of those 
negotiations in late October, id., Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden 
signed their 1989-90 individual employment contracts in December 
1989. R. Ill, 113. Notwithstanding the 1989 negotiations, 
during which the parties voluntarily agreed to certain 
contractual amendments, the provisions of the Master Contract — 
including specifically the requirement that the Board provide 
health insurance coverage to all members of the bargaining unit, 
including part-time teachers — remained in full force and 
effect. 
11It seems evident that no employee would agree to a separate 
contract that provided fewer benefits than the collective 
bargaining agreement with nothing in return — unless her 
employer required her to do so in order to obtain or retain her 
employment. Even accepting arguendo the Boardfs view that the 
contracts signed by Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden took them 
outside the coverage of the Master Contract — a point we 
vigorously dispute, as these two teachers did no more than sign 
the same individual employment contracts as were foreseen in the 
Master Contract and were presumably signed by every other member 
of the bargaining unit — the Board has provided no evidence 
whatever (not to mention evidence sufficient to prevail on a 
motion for summary judgment) to support its counterintuitive 
assertion that Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden voluntarily chose to 
opt out of the collective bargaining agreement and instead make 
separate — and less advantageous — deals with the Board. The 
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is to answer it. A collective bargaining agreement would have no 
meaning if an employer could evade its terms by the simple 
expedient of requiring individual employees, in order to obtain 
or retain their positions, to agree to accept less compensation, 
fewer benefits, or poorer working conditions than required by the 
collective bargaining agreement, and collective bargaining would, 
in turn, be illusory. Accordingly, if it is permissible for a 
school board to engage in collective bargaining with its 
employees — and we show elsewhere that it is, see PCEA Br. 19-
23; infra Part C — then the rule espoused by the Board must be 
rejected.12 
only evidence in the record of the two teachers' subjective 
intent with respect to their individual employment contracts 
suggests that they assented to such separate contracts only 
because they were required to do so in order to obtain their 
teaching positions for the 1989-90 school year. Thus, Ms. Hadden 
signed her contract under protest. See R. 113, 140. Moreover, 
as Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden were presumably aware that the 
Master Contract clause entitling them to full health insurance 
coverage was deemed incorporated into their individual contracts, 
R. 201 (5 2.2), their assent to those contracts cannot be seen as 
an acceptance of lower benefits than they were entitled to under 
the Master Contract or as a waiver of their right to challenge 
the Boardfs announced intent to deny them the benefits of the 
Master Contract. 
12There may be a somewhat closer question as to whether an 
employer that is bound by a collective bargaining agreement may 
negotiate separate agreements with individual employees that are 
more advantageous to the employee than (or simply different from) 
the collective bargaining agreement, and where the employee's 
decision to opt for such a separate contract, rather than 
remaining under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 
is purely voluntary. While this Court need not confront that 
issue in order to decide the case before it, we think it clear 
that even that question must, consistent with the concept of 
collective bargaining and exclusive representation, be answered 
in the negative. Certainly that is the answer the federal courts 
have given with respect to collective bargaining under the NLRA. 
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In support of its assertion that the Board may avoid its 
contractual obligations by negotiating conflicting individual 
contracts, the Board relies almost entirely on UCA § 34-20-7.13 
In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967), the 
Supreme Court explained that collective bargaining 
extinguishes the individual employee's power to order 
his own relations with his employer and creates a power 
vested in the chosen representative to act in the 
interests of all employees. . . . Thus only the union 
may contract the employee's terms and conditions of 
employment . . . . 
Similarly, Utah's Labor Relations Act, modeled after the NLRA, 
provides that representatives designated by the majority of 
employees "shall be the exclusive representatives of all the 
employees in that unit for the purposes of collective bargaining 
in respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of employment, cind of 
other conditions of employment," UCA § 34-20-9(1)(a) (emphasis 
added), while "individual employee[s]" are granted only the right 
to "present grievances to their employer at any time." UCA § 34-
20-9(1)(b). Of course, neither the NLRA nor its Utah analogue 
applies to school districts. As far as collective bargaining is 
concerned, that means principally that the employer cannot be 
compelled to bargain collectively. But once a school board has 
opted to deal with its employees by means of a collective 
bargaining agreement rather than through individual contracts — 
as it may under Utah law, see PCEA Br. 19-23; infra Part C — the 
effect of such a collective bargaining agreement should logically 
be the same. 
13The Board also cites two Attorney General opinions, Utah Att'y 
Gen. Op. No. 85-73 (Mar. 11, 1986), and Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 
88-002 (June 13, 1988), in support of its position, Board Br. 27-
28, but neither says anything on point. Both opinions merely 
emphasize that under Utah's right-to-work law, UCA §§ 34-34-1 et 
sea., collective bargaining may not "infringe on an individual's 
right to work or communicate directly with his employer." Op. 
No. 85-73. That is a far cry from saying, as does the Board, 
that an individual has a "right to contract with an employer 
despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement." 
Board Br. 27. As to the requirements of the right-to-work law 
itself — which explicitly preserves the right of employees to 
bargain collectively, UCA § 34-34-16 — there is nothing in the 
Master Contract that requires union membership or the payment of 
union dues or fees as a condition of employment, or that is 
otherwise contrary to the right-to-work law. 
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That provision, which is part of Utah's Labor Relations Act, 
provides as follows: 
Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such 
employees shall also have the right to refrain from any 
or all such activities. 
The Board's reliance on § 34-20-7 is misplaced for two reasons. 
In the first place, the Utah Labor Relations Act simply does 
not apply to public-sector employment. Section 34-20-2(5)(b) of 
that Act defines an "employer" subject to the Act to exclude "a 
state or political subdivision of a state." A school district, 
as a political subdivision of the state, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 
P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1977), is thus excluded from the coverage of 
the Labor Relations Act generally and of UCA § 34-20-7 
specifically. See also Westlv v. Board of City Commissioners, 
573 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Utah 1978) (per curiam) ("In the absence of 
explicit legislative language, statutes governing labor relations 
between employers and employees apply only to private industry 
and not to the sovereign or its political subdivisions.").14 
14Oddly enough, just three pages after relying on § 34-20-7 in an 
attempt to demonstrate that public employees have the right to 
bargain individually with their employers, the Board cites Westly 
for the just-quoted proposition that, absent "explicit 
legislative language," labor relations statutes have no 
application to public employment. See Board Br. 29. (The Labor 
Relations Act does, to be sure, contain explicit language — but 
it explicitly excludes public-sector employment from its 
coverage.) One is thus left with some uncertainty as to whether 
the Board believes the Labor Relations Act applies to it. If 
20. 
Moreover, the Board's interpretation of § 34-20-7 is 
defective even when judged on its own terms. That interpretation 
is inconsistent with the rest of the Labor Relations act, which 
— as we have already seen, supra n.12 — provides for exclusive 
representation of all employees by the designated majority 
representative with respect to the terms and conditions of 
employment, UCA § 34-20-9(1)(a), and leaves individual employees 
only the right to "present grievances to their employer at any 
time." UCA § 34-20-9(1)(b). Thus, it cannot be the Act's intent 
to allow individual employees "to contract with an employer 
despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement," 
Board Br. 27 — at least not to the extent that any such 
individual agreement is contrary to the terms of the governing 
collective agreement. 
The same conclusion is compelled for another reason. 
Section 34-20-7 is taken virtually verbatim from § 7 of the NLRA, 
29 U.S.C. § 157,15 and in interpreting that statute the courts 
have firmly rejected the construction the Board urges here. See 
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (quoted 
that Act did cover school districts, of course, the Board would 
be required to bargain collectively with the majority 
representative of its employees, UCA § 34-20-8(1)(d), and indeed 
the guarantee in UCA § 34-20-7 of the right "to engage in 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection" would afford the school 
district's employees the right to strike. Perhaps this explains 
the Board's ambivalence as to whether the Act applies to it. 
15The only substantive difference between § 7 and § 34-2 0-7 is 
the inclusion in the former of an additional proviso concerning 
union membership agreements, a matter not at issue here. 
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supra n.12); J.I. Case Co, v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-39 
(1944).16 Thus, even if § 34-20-7 applied to school districts — 
which it does not — it would not allow the Board to enter into 
an individual contract with an employee that conflicted with the 
collective bargaining agreement covering that employee. 
In short, nothing in the Board's argument supports its 
contention that the individual employment contracts signed by Ms. 
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden excused the Board from complying with 
its obligation under the Master Contract to provide them with 
health insurance coverage. 
C. The Board's Argument That "The Right of Public 
Employees to Bargain Collectively is Not at Issue in 
this Case," but if it were, School Boards Do Not Have 
Authority to Enter Into Collective Bargaining 
Agreements with Unions Representing Their Employees 
•(Board Br. 29-30) 
Although maintaining that "[t]he Court should not and need 
not decide whether collective bargaining is appropriate for 
public employees in order to address the issue presented," Board 
Br. 29,17 the Board, presumably in the interest of completeness, 
argues that this question should be answered in the negative. In 
16In construing those provisions of Utah's Labor Relations Act 
that are derived from the NLRA, Utah courts will consider the 
interpretation given the parallel NLRA provisions by the federal 
courts. Southeast Furniture Co. v. Industrial Commission, 100 
Utah 154, 156, 111 P.2d 153, 153-54 (1941). 
17The Board is mistaken in this regard. As we have shown, the 
lower court's decision precludes meaningful collective bargaining 
between the Board and PCEA, inasmuch as the Board could not enter 
into a legally binding collective bargaining agreement. 
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support of its position, the Board cites Westly v. Board of City 
Commissioners, 573 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1978) (per curiam); Pratt v. 
Citv Council, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981); and Local 2238 AFSCME v. 
Stratton, 769 P.2d 76 (N.M. 1989). We already have discussed 
Westly and Pratt, see PCEA Br. 21 n.15, and will not burden the 
Court with a reiteration here. A brief comment is appropriate, 
however, with regard to Local 2238 AFSCME v. Stratton. In this 
case, the New Mexico court in fact rejected the rule for which 
the Board cites the case (that express statutory authority is 
required for collective bargaining), and held instead that 
"collective bargaining by public employees in New Mexico is legal 
even without a statute explicitly addressing that subject." 769 
P.2d at 77 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that New Mexico 
statutes provided sufficient implicit authority for such 
bargaining: 
[I]f a power is granted expressly to a public body to 
do a certain act, but no specific mode or manner of 
exercising the power is prescribed, the public body in 
its discretion may chose a reasonable method to 
exercise the power expressly granted. . . . For 
example, if the power to bargain collectively has not 
been granted to the state agencies, but instead, the 
power to contract has, then the means to bargain 
collectively may be implied from the general power to 
contract in order to exercise that power effectively. 
Id. at 81. 
This reasoning is fully consistent with the standards 
applied by Utah courts in construing the powers of local 
political units. In State v, Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court abolished the previously applied 
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"Dillon's Rule" of strictly construing grants of authority to 
local political subdivisions. Henceforth, the court said, 
the courts will not interfere with the legislative 
choice of the means selected [to implement an 
authorized objective] unless it is arbitrary, or is 
directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the 
policy of, the state or federal laws or the 
constitution of this State or of the United States. 
Id. at 1126. See also id. at 1127 (Dillon's Rule should no 
longer be used to prevent local political units "from using 
reasonable means to implement specific grants of authority"). 
The Board's contention that school districts cannot engage in 
collective bargaining without "express statutory authority," 
Board Br. 30, belongs to an earlier era. Under the reasoning of 
Local 2238 AFSCME v. Stratton and State v. Hutchinson, the 
Board's concession that UCA § 53A-3-411(l) grants school boards 
the power to contract "with no restriction as to with whom the 
contract may be entered," Board Br. 2 0 n.2, should be dispositive 
of this issue. 
Finally, the Board contends that PCEA's "extensive 
references to legislation adopted in the 1993 [Utah] Legislative 
Session is not relevant [because] [t]he law applicable is the law 
in existence at the time the case was decided in the Circuit 
Court." Id. at 30.18 The Board misses the point. The cited 
18Presumably the applicable law is the law at the time of the 
events on which the litigation is based. In any event, however, 
there are no relevant differences in the law at the time of those 
events, the time of the circuit court's decision, and the present 
time. 
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statutes, see PCEA Br. 21-22, do not create the authority of 
school boards to bargain collectively, but they clearly assume 
(and are indeed predicated upon) the existence of such authority, 
They are, therefore, evidence of the Legislature's understanding 
of the law that was already in existence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in PCEA's opening brief, 
the judgment of the trial court dismissing PCEA's complaint 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the circuit court 
with instructions to deny the Board's motion for summary 
judgment, grant PCEA's motion for summary judgment, and enter 
judgment in favor of PCEA. 
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